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Authors and auteurs: the uses of theory  
John Caughie 
 
You know there’s a lot of detail in this movie; it’s absolutely essential because 
these little nuances enrich the over-all impact and strengthen the picture…. At the 
beginning of the film we show Rod Taylor in the bird shop. He catches the canary 
that has escaped from its cage, and after putting it back, he says to Tippi Hedren, 
‘I’m putting you back in your gilded cage, Melanie Daniels’. I added that sentence 
during the shooting because I felt it added to her characterization as a wealthy, 
shallow playgirl. And later on, when the gulls attack the village, Melanie Daniels 
takes refuge in a glass telephone booth and I show her as a bird in a cage. This 
time it isn’t a gilded cage, but a cage of misery, and it’s also the beginning of her 
ordeal by fire, so to speak. It’s a reversal of the age-old conflict between men and 
birds. Here the humans are in cages, and the birds are on the outside. When I 
shoot something like that, I hardly think the public is likely to notice it.  
– Alfred Hitchcock on The Birds (Truffaut, 1985: 285) 
 
Returning to auteurism and authorship after a decent interval, I am struck by two 
contradictory perceptions: first, that the auteur seems to have disappeared from the 
centre of theoretical debate in Film Studies; second, that this disappearance may in fact 
be an illusion and that the grave to which we consigned him – and, by implication, her – 
is, in fact, empty.   
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Reading the academic literature diagnostically, it seems that the delirium of auteurism 
has been sanitized by common sense. First, there is a select body of ‘postscripts’, 
‘retrospects’ and ‘revisitations’ which permit writers associated with ‘first-generation’ 
auteurism (Peter Wollen [2003], Geoffrey Nowell-Smith [2003], Robin Wood [2002], 
for example) to temper their affiliations, qualify their claims, and complicate their 
positions. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, in a number of areas – gender, 
sexuality, nationality, ethnicity -- there is a very pointed recognition that it may have 
been irresponsible or arrogant to declare the author dead just at the point at which 
previously ‘un-authorized’ constituencies began to speak with authority. And, thirdly, 
there is now a more scholarly and empirical understanding of the actual conditions of 
production which permitted and constrained the creativity and self-expression of the 
auteur; an understanding which, in fact, no longer needs the concept of an ‘auteur’ and 
is content to write about directors within ‘director-centred criticism’. ‘The death of the 
auteur’, says Victor Perkins, ‘is without the drastic consequences that some have 
imagined for the theory and practice of director-centred criticism’ (1990: 63).  
 
There is, then, a retreat both from the wilder shores of critical ecstasy (Fereydoun 
Hoveyda: ‘If anyone persists in thinking Party Girl an imbecility, I will cry out: Long 
live the imbecility which dazzles my eyes, fascinates my heart, and give me a glimpse 
of the kingdom of heaven!’ (1986 [1960]: 127) and from the opposite but equally wild 
shores of the closing sentence of Roland Barthes’ inescapable essay, in which he 
dramatically – or melodramatically – sentences the Author to death:  
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We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant, 
antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the very thing it sets 
aside, ignores, smothers or destroys; we know that to give writing its future, it is 
necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the 
death of the Author. (1977: 148) 
 
Avoiding the opposite extremes of beatification and damnation, academic discourse 
about authorship has become properly ‘academic’: measured, sceptical and open. 
Generations of students have learned not to be auteurist (‘I’m not being auteurist, 
but…’), and that authorship is a critical problem whose history they must learn in order 
to avoid temptations which they may never have felt. While the virtues of a measured, 
sceptical and open discourse are undoubtedly the ones we should be teaching and 
practicing, they do not wholly encompass the place which auteurism and authorship has 
occupied in film studies. Approached ‘commonsensically’, authorship as an area of 
engagement and debate seems to have lost its energizing force, its function as an irritant 
soothed by knowing hindsight. 
 
Meanwhile, slowly vanishing from academic debate, the auteur is everywhere else – in 
publicity, in journalistic reviews, in television programmes, in film retrospectives, in the 
marketing of cinema. Sometime around the point at which Film Studies began to be 
embarrassed by its affiliation to the author, the film industry and its subsidiaries began 
to discover with renewed enthusiasm the value of authorial branding for both marketing 
and reputation. It was already apparent by the late 1960s that auteurism was capacious 
and could accommodate even those who had first poured scorn on the politique des 
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auteurs as Gallic intellectual hooliganism. Now, it has become the air we breathe: 
auteurism has become ideology; ‘it really represents something without representing 
something real’ (Marx and Engels, 1974: 52). 
 
I should acknowledge at the outset my own contribution to this process. In the first 
paragraph of an article on homosexuality and authorship in Screen in 1991, Andy 
Medhurst paid waspish tribute to the Reader, Theories of Authorship (Caughie, 1981), 
which I edited for the British Film Institute in 1981: 
 
Authorship is hardly a hot issue these days. The very word itself conjures up 
ancient dusty battles over the cultural legitimacy of cinema, battles that were 
fought, won and forgotten long ago. The idea that a film’s director is the primary, 
shaping force of its meaning is simultaneously inscribed as middlebrow 
commonsense…and dismissed as hopelessly outmoded by every branch of recent 
critical theory. It is a dead debate, and its tombstone was the BFI Reader, Theories 
of Authorship, which offered an inbuilt teleology, a narrative trajectory which led 
me, as a postgraduate student, away from the embarrassments of romantic 
individualism to the chastening rigours of poststructuralist thought. (1991: 197–8) 
 
It would be hard to miss the double-edge. On the one hand, the collection of articles was 
indeed intended to do more than simply summarize positions: it was conceived as a 
theoretical intervention and it did have the narrative strategy which Medhurst 
experienced. On the other hand, I know irony when I see it, and I have some sympathy 
for its object. I have always had the suspicion that the success of the Reader – and 
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twenty-five years later it is still in print – was that it made authorship teachable by 
making it orderly. More than I would have thought at the time or would now welcome, 
a book which was intended to undermine the certainties of creative authority became 
authoritative. Such is the fate of authorial intention. 
 
In his Theories of Cinema, Francesco Casetti argues for an approach to theory which 
leaves open a space for debate, and he insists on the productivity of theoretical 
knowledge: ‘It is the productivity of a knowledge’, he says, ‘that ensures, perhaps more 
than anything else, its theoretical status’ (1999: 3). In his conclusion, he argues that it is 
not scientific rationality that defines a theory but its ‘cognitive capacity, in the broadest 
sense of the word’ (1999: 315). Rather than an achieved knowledge, theory is a means 
of achieving knowledge. Like experimental science itself, its methods can no longer be 
reduced to formalized ‘scientific’ constructs but are drawn to such nuanced forms as 
metaphor, analogy or parallelism. Furthermore, he says, 
 
a theory is knowledge that circulates among those working in a given field and 
through them reaches broader audiences, producing discussion, loyalties, and 
dissent. In this respect, it is a social device, something that is diffused and shared 
within a community. Finally, a theory is also a historical event: it is a discourse 
that comes on the scene at a given time, in a given place, and by its very presence 
is capable of defining the ambience in which it appears. In this sense, it is a 
historical reality, something that reflects the path (or even the error) of thought. 
(Casetti, 1999: 315) 
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Theory, then, ‘institutionalizes’ knowledge, but as a dynamic field constantly under 
review and revision, always open to debate and dissent.  
 
In Casetti’s sense, then, authorship is a theory: ‘a set of assumptions, more or less 
organized, explicit, and binding, which serves as a reference for scholars so that they 
can understand and explain the nature of the phenomenon under investigation’ (1999: 
2). While recognizing its origins in the editorial policy (the so-called ‘politique des 
auteurs’) of Cahiers du cinéma in the 1950s, the significance of authorship theory for 
Film Studies lies in its productivity: its production and institutionalization not simply of 
a ‘knowledge field’, but also of a community within which that field could be shared 
and contested: a field on which sides could be taken, theoretical battles fought, and 
solidarities formed and reformed. It was a field of debate in which the members of an 
emerging community began to identify themselves and define their studies and their 
terms of engagement. The practical and experiential importance of debate – not just in 
articles and books, but, in the UK, in BFI summer schools, Edinburgh Film Festival 
seminars, SEFT weekend schools, the foyers of cinemas – to an emerging field of study 
in Britain cannot be overemphasized. In the United States, the vituperative denunciation 
of Andrew Sarris’s ‘Notes on the auteur theory in 1962’ (1962/3) by Pauline Kael 
(1963) gave a polemical edge to auteurism which reverberated across the Atlantic (‘the 
Movie group’, she says, ‘ is like an intellectual club for the intellectually handicapped’ 
[22]), and inflected the partisan ways in which auteurism was taken up by criticism and, 
in turn, by academic film studies: ‘a spark was ignited’, says Sarris famously, ‘in far-off 
San Francisco by a lady critic with a lively sense of outrage’ (1968: 26).  Just as the 
lines of battle had been drawn in Paris between Cahiers du Cinéma and Positif, so in 
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Britain they were drawn between Sight and Sound, Movie and Screen and in the United 
States between the west coast Film Quarterly and the east coast Film Culture. The fact 
that the emerging field of study felt itself to be academically marginalized only 
intensified the debates, reinforced the solidarities, and drew the wagons into a tighter 
circle. The ‘historical reality’ of the various engagements with authorship was formative 
for many of us, and has left its mark on film studies – both the path of thought and the 
errors that went with it. 
 
It is customary for ‘historical realities’ to be so by forgetting the histories and realities 
that went before them, and the period from the 1950s to the 1970s was fertile ground for 
both ‘new waves’ and for amnesia. It is easy to form the impression that film theory – 
like teenagers and sex – were invented in that period, and that before the polemics of 
Cahiers in the 1950s and its skirmishes with Positif there was no debate about the art of 
film, or that before the meeting of auteurism and structuralism in the 1970s there was no 
theory of the artist. To get the measure of authorship theory and its particular impact, it 
seems important to have some sense of the theoretical field which preceded it and into 
which it burst. 
 
In 1948, Alexandre Astruc had already proclaimed the ‘new age of cinema’ to be ‘the 
age of the caméra stylo’ in which, using the camera as his pen, ‘an artist can express his 
thoughts, however abstract they may be, or translate his obsessions exactly as he does in 
the contemporary essay or novel’ (1981: 9). Astruc was referring specifically to an 
avant-garde cinema, and in the anglophone world he can be placed most clearly in the 
tradition of Close Up and the group around Kenneth MacPherson where the role of the 
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director/artist as poet of the cinema was implicit in the criticism and explicit in the 
filmmaking practice (Donald et al., 1998). The assumption of the artist applied to the 
avant garde, however, was only more explicit than the insistence on film as an art form 
which can be found in a number of the theoretical discussions of cinema from the silent 
period onwards. In Rudolf Arnheim’s Film as Art (1957), the ‘film artist’ appears 
almost interchangeably with the director in the application of creative technique to 
expression.  Arnheim argues that in the earliest film the intention was simply to capture 
objective reality without mediation or ‘distortion’. 
 
Only gradually, and at first probably without conscious intention, the possibility 
of using the differences between film and real life for the purpose of making 
formally significant images was realized. What before had been ignored or simply 
accepted was now intelligently developed, displayed, and made into a tool to 
serve the desire for artistic creation. The object as such was no longer the first 
consideration. Its place in importance was taken by the pictorial representation of 
its properties, the making apparent of an inherent idea, and so forth. (Arnheim, 
1957: 41–2) 
 
Here, the film artist ‘distorts’ the unmediated photographic reality through 
representation in order to bring forth an inherent idea, a concept of expressiveness 
which would be comfortable with both Russian montage theory and German 
expressionism. 
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For Béla Balázs, whose Theory of Film was first published in Moscow in 1945 as 
Iskusstvo Kino (The Art of Cinema), the story was one of  
 
the transformation of cinematography from a technique into an art, the 
transformation of a moving picture industry, which merely reproduced stage 
performances, into an autonomous, independent, utterly novel art-producer…. 
(Balázs, 1970: 155) 
 
Sharing with Georg Lukács, his compatriot and fellow member of The Budapest 
Sunday Circle, a distrust of the avant garde – ‘a hangover from the psychotic conditions 
following the first world war; it was one of the ways in which bourgeois consciousness 
sought to escape reality’ (Balázs, 1970: 158) – Balázs found no difficulty in 
conceptualizing an art form which was both popular and industrial. He shared with 
Siegfried Kracauer and André Bazin, however, an insistence on an artist/director whose 
subjectivity was to be subjugated in the service of reality: 
 
the artist may see any however unusual and strange physiognomy in his object, 
but as long as he sees it in the object and cuts it out of it, as Michelangelo cuts the 
figures he saw in his mind out of the block of marble, so long as he derives the 
physiognomy of the work of art from his object and does not project it into the 
object, so long is his art realistic. The artist is a realist as long as he does not 
change the structure and meaning of his object by subjectively drawn outlines. 
(Balázs, 1970: 101) 
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What emerges most clearly from these early theorists is an explication of the 
evolutionary development of techniques which allow cinema to move from the 
photographic reproduction of reality to its creative representation, from a technology to 
an art. This is not to suggest that there was a consensus about film authorship before the 
debates of the 1950s and 1960s.  With Kracauer’s insistence (1960) that an art of 
representation is defined by the technology of reproduction, one can see the debate 
opening up between those who held that the artist/director is defined by the creative use 
of the techniques available to him, and those for who the business of the artist was to 
reshape the world or construct a new one. While Eisenstein and the Soviet theorists, 
however, would take the latter view, they would probably agree about the subjugation 
of the individual personality in the face of a revolutionary reality. It was the reality 
which was different rather than the role of the artist. In this respect, these theorists of 
cinema can be located in a critical tradition of impersonality, a tradition which stretches 
from the socialist pragmatism of Engels (‘The more the opinions of the author remain 
hidden, the better for the work of art’ [1976: 91]) to the literary modernism of Eliot 
(‘Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the 
expression of personality, but an escape from personality’ [1960: 58]). 
 
This suggests at least one part of the theoretical context for the offensive of Cahiers and 
the significance of the debates and arguments about authorship which followed. When 
Andrew Sarris proclaims ‘the distinguishable personality of the director as a criterion of 
value’ (1981: 64), he is out of harmony not only with Pauline Kael and the assumptions 
of established film criticism and theory, but also with a dominant current of modernist 
thought about intention, impersonality and the artist. It is a commonplace that auteurism 
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is a romanticism and can be traced to the aesthetic theories of the nineteenth-century 
Romantics. In fact, however, its antecedents may be found more clearly in the agonism 
of the early twentieth-century avant garde, and it is appropriate that the journal in which 
Sarris published his ‘Notes and the auteur theory in 1962’ was Film Culture, a journal 
founded by Jonas Mekas in 1954 as the critical and theoretical voice of New York 
‘underground’ film. In this respect, the criticism of Cahiers may have constituted an 
even more radical break than Bazin suspected from the prewar hostility to the aesthetic 
or revolutionary avant garde of the 1920s and 1930s which he shared with Balåzs and 
Kracauer. The line between auteurism and the avant garde is in no sense 
straightforward, and it is complicated by Cahiers’ skirmishes over auteurism with 
Positif, the journal more usually linked with the politics of surrealism in France. 
Nevertheless, it is worth establishing some lines of connection between auteurism and 
the agonistic aesthetic of the avant garde – if only to rescue it from automatic 
association with a simple and infantile romanticism.  
 
Even more contentious for film criticism than the assertion of personality as a criterion 
of value was the assertion that the value of the auteur was guaranteed not by the 
seriousness or moral purpose of the film’s content but by the audacity of its style: 
‘Morality’, said Luc Moullet infamously, ‘is a question of tracking shots’ (1985: 148). 
This opened the way for a criticism which had little to say about ‘important’ films like 
Lawrence of Arabia (David Lean, 1962) or The Red Badge of Courage (John Huston, 
1951) but could find the kingdom of heaven in Party Girl (Nicholas Ray, 1958) or The 
Girl Can’t Help It (Frank Tashlin, 1956). The claim which brought down the greatest 
contempt from their contemporaries on both sides of the English Channel, and even 
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won an indulgent finger-wagging from their paterfamilias, Bazin, was the claim that the 
best film of a metteur en scène, a director without a consistent signature, was less 
interesting than the worst film of an auteur: emblematically, Casablanca (Michael 
Curtiz, 1942) was less interesting than Wee Willie Winkie (John Ford, 1937). 
Furthermore, since, as Eric Rohmer argued (scandalously invoking Titian, Rembrandt 
and Beethoven), ‘The history of art … contains no example of an authentic genius who 
has experienced, at the end of his career, a period of decline’ (1981: 38), then it follows 
that Casablanca must be considerably less interesting than Red Line 7000 (Howard 
Hawks, 1965). Reviewing Red Line 7000 in Cahiers in 1966, Jean Narboni finds in the 
film the mark of ‘someone ageless’ for whom ‘everything…was being presented once 
and for all in a unique present’. ‘What we have here’, he says, 
 
is a cinema that has to be taken in its entirety, a vast nervous system, a magnetic 
field, a multi-layered network. It conjures up the belief voiced by Edward G. 
Robinson in Tiger Shark [Howard Hawks, 1932] that a man can only enter heaven 
whole (repeated in The Big Sky [Howard Hawks, 1952]). So it is with Hawks’s 
films, which posterity and our own rather remotely connected generation will 
have to accept as a totality, a whole oeuvre, and not as a series of films. (1986: 
217) 
 
The ‘effrontery’ of Cahiers is well documented, its enthusiasms on occasion masking a 
political insouciance which toppled over into reaction. Following Casetti, however – ‘a 
theory is also a historical event’ – it was precisely this effrontery which effected a 
paradigm shift in thinking and writing about cinema. The theoretical and critical writing 
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about cinema from the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, exactly anticipating writing about 
television from the 1980s and 1990s, was concerned to ‘take film seriously’: for Balázs, 
‘the question of educating the public to a better, more critical appreciation of the films 
is a question of the mental health of nations’ (1970: 17). The concept of a popular art 
was by no means widely accepted and there was still work to be done to establish ‘in the 
consciousness of our generation this most important artistic development of our 
century’ (Balázs, 1970: 17). Film theory, like film education, was bound up in film 
appreciation: it was important that the public understood the techniques which the film 
artist had at his or her disposal in order that it could appreciate the good and shun the 
bad.  
 
Cahiers, on the other hand, in its sensibility and its rhetoric, begins from the premise 
that cinema is – self-evidently – an art which can be discussed in the same way as the 
great monuments of European culture, applying to Nicholas Ray the same criteria which 
might be applied to Goethe (‘It would mean little enough to say that Bitter Victory is the 
most Goethian of films’ [Godard, 1985: 119]) or comparing Luchino Visconti with 
Vermeer (Ayfre, 1985: 185).  
 
If Domarchi, for example, quotes Hegel and Kant in discussing Minnelli, he does 
so neither out of pedantry nor a love of paradox, but simply because cinema is at 
least as important as theatre, literature or painting! (Hoveyda, 1986b: 139)  
 
Differing both from its predecessors and from its contemporaries in England, where the 
engagement with popular culture was always pulled between cultural advocacy and 
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political inoculation, Cahiers, in a critical language unfamiliar to the empirical 
traditions of Anglo-Saxon protestanism, celebrated the mysteries of its chosen auteurs 
whose personalities broke through the routines of industry, commerce, and small-
mindedness. The first achievement of the Cahiers writers was to develop, almost by 
accident, a critical ‘style’ which, rather than ‘educating the public to a better, more 
critical appreciation of the films’, created a field of debate within a community of 
interest, the kind of field out of which theory develops. Their writing was the first step 
towards the institutionalization of a knowledge, the formation of a critical community 
which really cared whether Minnelli was an auteur or a metteur en scène. 
 
Their second achievement, of course, was to establish some of the terms in which that 
debate might be conducted. While it may have been self-evident that film was an art and 
that directors were its primary artists, it was not self-evident which directors were 
artists, the true auteurs; which were metteurs en scène, the craftsmen capable of 
producing meritorious films but without a consistent personality; and which were mere 
tradesmen, more or less competent but seldom rising about the meretricious. To place 
directors in this hierarchy, later formalized in a finer grain by Andrew Sarris (1968), 
and particularly to settle boundary disputes both within their own ranks and with their 
favourite adversaries in Positif, required both a knowledge and a method. It required a 
knowledge of a very large corpus of films: not simply a sampling along an already 
approved crest line, but a kind of profligate intemperance of viewing in which nothing 
could be left out in case that is where the key lay, and in which, as Narboni says, the 
auteur’s work can be grasped as a whole, an oeuvre, rather as a series of films. And it 
required a method of reading films: a reading which, somewhat curiously, resonates 
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with F.R. Leavis’s definition of the critic’s task ‘to determine what is actually there in 
the work of art’, sensitive to ‘the difference between that which has been willed and put 
there, or represents no profound integration, and that which grows from a deep centre of 
life’ (1963: 224–5).  
 
However far current film scholars might wish to distance themselves from the 
impressionistic agonism of Cahiers’ judgements in the 1950s, its footprint can still be 
seen in the sand: a legacy of debate, of reading and of the omnivorous appetite of the 
cinephile. Two pathways opened up from the politique d’auteurs which determine the 
direction of authorship theory and mark out routes for film theory more generally: first, 
and most indelibly, there was an attention to mise en scène, not simply as a set of 
techniques for the representation of reality but as a language of creativity with which an 
auteur transformed material.  
 
When I say that everything is expressed on the screen through mise en scène, I in 
no way contest the existence or the importance of the subject matter. I simply 
want to point out that the distinguishing feature of a great author is precisely his 
ability to metamorphose the stupidest plot through his technique. It is obvious that 
if we tried to summarize the plot of Time Without Pity [Joseph Losey, 1957], we 
would end up with a very weak melodrama. But do we go to the cinema to 
translate images into words? (Hoveyda, 1986b: 139) 
 
Mise en scène was the language – the ‘specific signifying practice’ – of cinema, and the 
analysis of mise en scène was a method of detection, finding there rather than in subject 
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matter the signature of the director. Though the object of detection may have shifted in 
later theory away from the creative subject – the auteur – towards the ‘positioned 
subject’ – the spectator, the methods of decipherment or decoding through an 
investigation of the language and signification of mise en scène was the foundation of 
the textual analysis which secured for Film Studies a place of grudging respect in the 
humanities and the academy.  
 
If the first pathway led towards language and the significations of the image, the second 
pathway led towards narrative and the themes which structured narrative. In his 
‘Autocritique’ in Cahiers in 1961, Fereydoun Hoveyda anticipates the figure who will 
later move to the centre of the theoretical stage: the psychoanalyst: 
 
This leads me to clarify my ideas on the critic’s function. In many respects, it 
resembles that of the psychoanalyst. Does he not, in effect, have to reconstruct 
through the film the discourse of the auteur (subject) in its continuity, bring to 
light the unconscious that underpins it and explain the particular way it is 
articulated? (Hoveyda, 1986c: 261) 
 
What came to be known as auteur structuralism or cine-structuralism, identified with the 
work of Wollen and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith in Britain in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, followed from the insistence of the politique on thematic consistency and 
wholeness as a mark of the auteur’s signature. While for Cahiers much of the attention 
focused on mise en scène as the scene of personality, it was a relatively short step, 
following the success of structuralism in the social sciences, to seek out thematic 
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structures across the work of an auteur, and crucially, as Hoveyda implies, to seek 
structures of which the auteur himself may be unconscious. Increasingly in the 1960s, 
the writers of Cahiers, in step with a growing body of theory in both Britain and the US, 
moved away from the auteur as creator of varying degrees of genius towards an author-
subject who is written by the text, and can be read out of its signs and structures. 
Wollen’s famous distinction between ‘Fuller or Hawks or Hitchcock, the directors’ and 
‘“Fuller” or “Hawks” or “Hitchcock”, the structures named after them’ (1972: 168) 
appears again in Jean-Pierre Oudart’s identification of John Ford as an ‘inscription’ 
(1981: 185) in the influential reading of Young Mr Lincoln (John Ford, 1939) which the 
editors of Cahiers undertook collectively in 1970 (Cahiers du cinéma editors. 1970: 29-
47). The beneficiary of this devaluation of the authorial currency and the depreciation in 
the dignity of the auteur from artist to structure, from inscriber to inscription was 
‘ideology’. It was not the author who spoke, but ideology, an ideology which could be 
detected in the gaps, ruptures and contradictions of the text. The method inherited from 
auteurism remained the same, a detailed reading to uncover the text’s hidden places, but 
it was no longer the personality of the author which was hidden there, but ideology – of 
which the author was the bearer rather than the creator. It is at this point that the author 
becomes – almost literally – a shadow of his former self, leaving traces in the text rather 
than dominating it with his unique signature; shading into structure, inscription or 
function; an object of desire for the cinephile, a subject whose subjectivity is an effect 
of the text.  
 
In this account, I am giving particular weight to the contribution of the early writing of 
Cahiers du cinéma because, revisiting earlier teleologies, including my own (1981), I 
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am struck by the impression which they give that the theory of authorship does not 
really start until the arrival of structuralism, bringing with it ‘science’ to rescue us from 
‘ideology’. I would argue now that it was in that earlier period that the field of 
knowledge and a method to define it began to be defined, and that theory as a field of 
debate and contestation became both formative and animating, generating an 
engagement which was quite distinct from the educative impulse of the pioneers and an 
intellectual excitement which was symptom and cause of a paradigm shift in the study 
of film and cinema. 
 
It was a short step from the author as an ‘unconscious’ effect of the text to the 
theoretical death of the author. Barthes’ short essay, ‘The Death of the Author’ (1977), 
first published in France in 1968, is one of those texts which has reverberated through 
the whole field of criticism and critical theory, echoing the ‘death of God’, causing 
similar forms of perturbation and consternation, and leaving behind similar gaps and 
possibilities in the hermeneutics of meaning and the determination of value. In many 
spheres, the death of the author has become so much a commonplace that it has become 
a barrier to further thought, a knowing wink which can be shared as a mark of 
distinction between people who know better than to think anything else. And yet, as 
Wollen notes in his essay on Michael Curtiz, returning to his yellowing copy of the 
original in Manteia, ‘although written in Barthes’s most provocative style (shades of 
Truffaut), it is not quite as earthshaking as I had remembered’ (2003: 69). Stripped of 
the rhetorical flourish of his final resounding (and infinitely repeatable) phrase – ‘the 
birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author’ (Barthes, 1977: 148) – 
the essay appears as itself the condensed trace of positions already elaborated in 
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Barthes’ writing and in a tradition of modernist writing stretching back to the nineteenth 
century (Barthes himself appeals to Mallarmé and Proust). The ‘scandal’ of ‘The Death 
of the Author’ is  the tip of a more complex historical argument turned into a rhetorical 
coup de grâce.  
 
Again it is worth establishing the context into which Barthes’ essay intervened. He is 
reacting against an interpretative criticism which seeks in the personality of the author 
the truth of the fiction and the guarantee of the interpretation:  
 
The explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced 
it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of 
the fiction, the voice of a single person, the author ‘confiding’ in us. (1977: 143) 
 
The tyranny of the author is attributed to an ‘ordinary culture’, hungry for the 
biographical and psychological background which fleshes out the ‘image of literature’, 
and to a tradition of criticism which finds in Baudelaire’s work ‘the failure of 
Baudelaire the man’, in Van Gogh’s ‘his madness’ and in Tchaikovsky’s ‘his vice’ 
(1977: 143). These are powerful traditions in both the academy and the public sphere, 
and the strength of their appeal cannot be ignored, particularly in the present moment 
when a culture of celebrity obsessed with the biography and psychology of the artist 
seeps into any discussion of contemporary authorship. Indeed, the tradition which finds 
in the life of the author the meaning of the work is so embedded that it could not, even 
in 1968, simply be extirpated by a theoretical intervention, however persuasive. Rather, 
in film studies as in other branches of the humanities, it was driven underground for a 
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fairly brief period to the place where unfashionable ideas regroup. In more recent 
writing, there is a palpable sense of relief that the proscription against auteurism has 
been lifted: witness Dudley Andrew’s sharp irony in 1993: ‘Breathe easily. Épuration 
has ended. After a dozen years of clandestine whispering we are permitted to mention, 
even to discuss, the auteur again’ (1993: 77). [1]  
 
These are the terms of engagement governing the skirmishes by which we mark out 
territory and keep debate alive. But before we exhume the author and bury Barthes, it is 
worth recalling what was at stake. For Barthes, the author – or ‘modern scriptor’ – does 
not precede the text, but is ‘born simultaneously’ (1977: 145) with it. He or she does not 
stand behind the text as its truth, authorizing a correct reading, but is written in the text, 
identical with the writing. ‘Writing’, says Barthes, 
 
is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, 
composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all 
identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing. (1977: 142)  
 
While we might legitimately wish to draw back from the absolutism of Barthes’ decree, 
particularly in respect of film where the moment of ‘writing’ becomes a process of 
corporate and industrial production, there is a challenge to the authority of origins and 
intentions which is liberating for criticism and enabling for the critical reader. In the 
context of current debate, it may not be necessary to insist on the death of the author but 
it is still worth contesting her or his authority as the determinant of meaning.  
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One of the effects of the challenge to the centrality of the author was a challenge to the 
centrality of interpretation as the primary purpose of criticism. The business of a textual 
criticism focused on writing rather than meaning is to engage with the work and play of 
language and signification rather than to fix meaning. Interestingly, it becomes easier to 
see the importance of Susan Sontag (a writer who often plays leapfrog with Barthes) 
and her key, similarly manifesto-like essay, ‘Against interpretation’ (1969), written in 
1964, four years before ‘The Death of the Author’: 
 
The aim of all commentary on art now should be to make works of art – and by 
analogy, our own experience – more, rather than less, real to us. The function of 
criticism should be to show how it is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather 
than to show what it means.
In place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art. (1969: 23) 
 
Interestingly also, an erotics of art seems to rescue auteur criticism from the reductive 
structuralism which reduced films and oeuvres to a pattern of meanings identified, post 
facto, with an ‘unconscious’ auteur and returns it to the exuberance of Cahiers, its 
attention to film as a ‘writing’ – a ‘caméra-stylo’ – and the kingdom of heaven found in 
a tracking shot. It is just such an erotics of art that Laura Mulvey wrestles with in her 
much-cited 1975 article, ‘Visual pleasure and narrative cinema’. It also forms the basis 
for a body of criticism across the arts which tries to understand the complex interplay of 
textuality and subjectivity, an interplay which frequently invokes, if not the personality 
or biography of the author, at least the figure of the author as, in Michel Foucault’s  
terms, a ‘function’ of the text (1977). Such a criticism still seems to me to form a 
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central, if not an exclusive, focus of the film theory with which a critical film studies 
still needs to engage. 
 
However unfashionable Barthes in his turn may become -- or may already have become, 
-- the debt to him is considerable. In many ways, his argument in its more nuanced 
forms gives a centrality to the development of a rigorous and robust film analysis, the 
kind of reading of films which has been one of the jewels in film studies’ crown. In the 
absence of an authorizing voice, the critic or the student seeks support for her reading in 
the authority of her analysis, opening up how the text works rather than closing it down 
to what it means. Without the author as the ultimate guarantee, the analysis is never 
final and complete, but remains partial. In the retreat from extremes, this is one of the 
things we hold on to. It is part of the terms of engagement that the pendulum does not 
swing all the way back.  
 
While Barthes’ impact on auteurism and authorship theory was direct, apparent and 
tangible, an indirect, but probably more pervasive, impact can be identified in the 
development of a body of film scholarship which questioned, in the name of empirical 
evidence and historical enquiry, what it believed to be the inflated claims of ‘Grand 
Theory’. This body of work is most clearly associated with David Bordwell who has 
provided – most particularly in The Classical Hollywood Cinema (1985), written with 
Kristin Thomson and Janet Staiger – a scholarly account of a particular period of 
Hollywood cinema which, among other things, replaces the ‘genius’ of the author with 
‘the genius of the system’, a familiar phrase appropriated from André Bazin’s  
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comradely critique in 1957 of the auteurism of his younger colleagues at Cahiers du 
cinéma: 
 
The American cinema is a classical art, but why not then admire in it what is most 
admirable, i.e. not only the talent of this or that filmmaker, but the genius of the 
system, the richness of its ever-vigorous tradition, and its fertility when it comes 
into contact with new elements…. ([1957] 1985: 258) 
 
 
Though Bordwell (1996) has confronted ‘Grand Theory’ more directly and more 
tendentiously elsewhere, it is in the historical scholarship of his and his colleagues’ 
development of Bazin’s ‘classical art’ that the work has been most persuasive, leaving 
its mark in the teaching and writing even of those of us who would not align ourselves 
with his philosophical position. Bordwell uses the term ‘classical’ precisely, not to 
assign value or consign to a particular place in the memory of cinema, but to define a 
system. In the opening section of the book he justifies the use of the term thus: 
 
the principles which Hollywood claims as its own rely on notions of decorum, 
proportion, formal harmony, respect for tradition, mimesis, self-effacing 
craftsmanship, and cool control of the perceiver’s response – canons which critics 
in any medium usually call ‘classical’. (Bordwell, 1985: 3–4) 
 
He goes on to describe the components of this classical narrative system in terms of 
‘devices’ (pan, dissolve, field reverse-field), ‘systems’ (time, space, narrative 
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causation), and crucially, ‘relations between systems’: ‘In the Hollywood style, the 
systems do not play equal roles: space and time are almost always made vehicles for 
narrative causality’ (Bordwell, 1985: 6).  
 
A classical cinema, then, like any classical art, is rule-bound and systematic, and the 
strengths and limitations of Bordwell’s approach lie in its system building: a scholarly 
rationality which is both explanatory and oppressively totalizing. The artist is one 
insofar as he or she articulates the rules with a proper balance of originality and 
deference, imagination and propriety. It is not an art of unbridled expression, but of 
articulation, articulating the conventions and expectations in a way which gives the 
audience enough repetition to ensure recognition and familiarity and enough difference 
to make it new and singular. Among the factors which might motivate the components 
of the filmic system (genre, verisimilitude, narrative causality), Bordwell includes 
‘artistic motivation’ which permitted individual artistic flourish as a signature of 
variation, but discouraged – or punished – it when it threatened the integrity of the 
classical narration: ‘overt narration, the presence of a self-conscious “author” not 
motivated by realism or genre or story causality, can only be intermittent and 
fluctuating in the classical film’ (1985: 79). A classical art at its most classical 
acknowledges the presence of an artist, but as a component of the system, articulating 
its conventions, enlivening its rules: refreshing it but never dominating it with his 
personality or his self-expression. It is worth quoting Bordwell at length to trace his 
delimitation of the auteur: 
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In Western music, the classical style creates dynamism by departing from and 
returning to a stable tonal center. Something like this dynamism appears in the 
Hollywood auteur film. The auteur film draws its sustenance from the classical 
base, which is visible in the film. The film mixes narrational modes – some 
systems operating according to classical probabilities, others intermittently 
foregrounded as less probable and more distinctive. Far from being a fault or flaw, 
this mixture can be a source of aesthetic value to those prepared to perceive it. 
Most often, an idiosyncratic exploration of causality, time, or space works to 
reaffirm the norm by revealing the suppleness and range of the paradigm. At rarer 
moments, a deviant narrational process can be glimpsed. We see the norm afresh, 
understand its functions better, recognize previously untapped possibilities in it, 
and – on a few occasions – reflect upon how our trust in the norm can mislead us. 
The Hollywood auteur film offers a particular pleasure and knowledge: the 
spectator comes to recognize norm and deviation oscillating, perhaps wrestling, 
within the same art work, that work being actively contained by the pressures of 
tradition. (1985: 82)  
 
Such common sense makes sense of the auteur in the classical system in a way which is 
hard to contest, and in their closing chapter, Bordwell and Staiger make explicit their 
recognition of alternative – and post-1960 – modes of film practice which do not 
conform to the classical system and in which the auteur functions differently – though 
nonetheless systematically. As well as being apparently flexible, the approach is 
eminently teachable: susceptible to historical evidence and to demonstration through the 
close analysis of what is actually there on the screen. It avoids the mysteries of intention 
 
 26
and expressive personality on the one hand and of an abstract ‘writing without origin’ 
on the other.  
 
To pause for a moment, however, on the concept of the classical and push a little 
Bordwell’s analogy with Western music, both confirming it and qualifying it, I want to 
quote – again at length – from an essay in the Times Literary Supplement by Stephen 
Brown, ‘Mozart, Classical form, and the rescue from equanimity’ (2006), one of a 
number of articles associated with Mozart’s two hundred and fiftieth anniversary. Like 
Bordwell, Brown begins by sketching the outlines of the classical system: 
 
 A formula for producing a convincing Classical piece of music might look like 
this: start with an axiomatic idea, one so simple and basic that it is hard to imagine 
reducing it further. You’re in the key of C? Then create an outline of a C major 
chord. (A little more than half of Mozart’s piano sonatas start with an outline of 
the home-key chord.) That’s a little angular; balance it with a softer turn of 
phrase. Now balance those two bars with two other bars. Where the first used 
chords I and V, the balancing phrase could start with IV and work its way back to 
I. Now we have four bars without much flow; balance them with another four bars 
of running scales. Keep in mind that everything must be clear and distinct: no 
thick textures, just melody and accompaniment. Continue along this path, follow 
the rules of sonata form, and you too can create a bad – but realistic – example of 
Classical-sounding music. (2006: 18) 
 
He then proceeds to cases: 
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 I recently attended a concert where I heard a lovely performance of the Concerto 
for Two Clarinets by Franz Krommer, born in 1759, just three years after Mozart. 
It followed the kind of Classical formula described above and bored me nearly 
senseless with its predictability. But I have heard Mozart’s Piano Sonata No. 11 
on A Major (K331), the one that ends with the famous ‘Rondo alla Turca’, 
countless times; at one time in my youth I could play the piece from memory, and 
even today I do not find it boring. How can Krommer be boring on a first hearing 
and Mozart not boring on the 500th? (2006: 18)  
 
The analogy seems to me to illuminate and illustrate the functioning of the classical 
analogy, but, more importantly, Brown’s simple question – how can Krommer be 
boring and Mozart not boring? -- seems to me to lie at the heart of the question of 
authorship in a classical system, limiting the explanatory reach of a purely systematic 
approach. The displacement of the auteur onto the system and the systematization of 
motivation within the rules of the game, however appealingly common sense they may 
be, leave some nagging questions about creativity, imagination and the artist which 
apply even within – or particularly within – a classical art. What is it that makes the 
difference, and what difference does difference make? Or Samuel Beckett, appropriated 
by Foucault: ‘What matters who’s speaking, someone said, what matter’s who’s 
speaking?’ (Beckett, 1974: 16). [2]  
 
The work of Bordwell – and his colleagues and associates – has been hugely influential. 
(With irresistible irony, Bordwell himself has suffered the fate of the structuralist’s 
auteur: an apostrophization in which Bordwell, the scholar, must often be rescued from 
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‘Bordwell’, the structure named after him.) Most particularly in his essay, 
‘Contemporary film studies and the vicissitudes of Grand Theory’, in the collection 
which he edited with Noël Carroll in 1996, Bordwell challenges what he identifies as 
‘Grand Theories’, such as ‘subject-position theory’ and ‘culturalism’. These are defined 
as ‘Grand Theories’ because ‘their discussions of cinema are framed within schemes 
which seek to describe or explain very broad features of society, history, language and 
psyche’ (1996: 3). Bordwell diagnoses what he depicts as a pathological attachment to 
Parisian theory, offering an account of its ‘viscissitudes’ supported by evidence based 
on quotation – quotation which is, of course, selected to support the diagnosis. ‘Why 
this reliance on Parisian sources?’ (1996: 19), he asks. He turns back to the process of 
self-definition as a discipline which Film Studies was going through in the 1970s and 
1980s, and he takes auteurism as an exemplary instance: 
 
in the effort to win academic respectability, film scholars could best show their 
work to have significance if there were a powerful theory backing it up. 
Auteurism was a connoisseurship that required a staggering knowledge of 
particular films. In an academic context, such knowledge could seem mere 
buffery, so auteur studies could not justify studying movies ‘seriously’. An 
analysis of Hitchcock that purported to demonstrate a theory of signification or 
the unconscious was more worth of academic attention than an analysis of 
recurring authorial motifs. (19)  
 
In place of ‘Grand Theory’, Bordwell supports the emergence in the 1980s of what he 
calls ‘middle-level research’, pre-empting accusations of being ‘anti-theory’ with the 
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argument that such research addresses questions that have both ‘empirical and 
theoretical import’ (1996: 27), and insisting, in his own italics, ‘you do not need to have 
a Theory of Everything to do enlightening work in a field of study’, or with fewer italics 
but more persuasively: 
 
Contrary to what many believe, a study of United Artists’ business practices or 
the standardization of continuity editing or the activities of women in early film 
audiences need carry no determining philosophical assumptions about subjectivity 
and culture, no univocal metaphysical or epistemological or political presumption 
– in short, no commitment to a Grand Theory. (1996: 29)  
 
Like the influence of Barthes in his time, the influence of Bordwell and his associates 
has been emancipatory in certain ways, freeing up the citation list from the usual 
suspects (Foucault, Barthes, Lacan), and realigning theory with empirical research in a 
way which has been productive for film studies in the academy. The growth of 
historical research and the respect for empirical evidence since the 1980s has been 
formative for film studies as an academic discipline, and there is a greater willingness 
now, for example, to recognize a study of the activities of women in early film 
audiences, even if not itself theoretical, as the building-blocks of a theory which appeals 
to evidence rather than to avatars. For work on authorship, this has led to a diversity of 
approach which is embodied in a collection such as that of David Gerstner and Janet 
Staiger, Authorship and Film (2003), and perhaps most emblematically in that 
collection in Wollen’s (2003) revisitation of his early auteurism in a study of Curtiz 
which brings together empirical evidence, textual analysis and theory.  
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It has also permitted those questions to be re-opened which were shamefully closed by 
the ‘death of the author’ thesis: questions of agency in areas in which authority was 
socially and critically neglected. There were always degrees of death, and Hitchcock 
was always likely to be more dead than Jean-Luc Godard. Raised from the dead, can a 
single theory of authorship deal with Hitchcock, Godard, Abbas Kiarostami, Sally 
Potter and Bill Viola? And how does a ‘high theory’ of authorship deal with the 
intention expressed in the quotation which forms the epigraph to this essay. 
 
As the essay was being written, Good Night, and Good Luck (George Clooney, 2005) 
was released in the UK, and it seemed to me to crystallize some of the variables which 
now open up in front of authorship. There is George Clooney, directing and co-writing 
an openly ‘political’ film – in black and white and at a very precise political moment in 
both Britain and the US when issues of freedom of speech are at the top of the agenda. 
The moment gives particular sharpness to questions of agency and intention, an 
intention which is made explicit as it is repeated in interview after interview. The power 
of agency which is required to direct a political film in black and white is conferred by 
celebrity, a celebrity which is conferred, in its turn, through acting – and not only 
through acting, but through acting on television (and not only on television but on 
hospital melodrama). The power of this agency is confirmed rather than denied by 
Clooney’s own self-effacing performance – as supporting actor – in ‘his’ film: a self-
effacement which only real power can aspire to. And, as Barthes correctly claims, 
‘ordinary culture’ is hungry for the biography which precedes and explains the motive 
behind the film. In interviews, reviews, articles, television programmes, Clooney’s 
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authorship is attributed to his respect for his father and for his father’s history of 
engagement. It is his family biography, his inheritance of political integrity from his 
father, which is called into play to define and explain his authorship. And behind the 
biographies of father and son, there is the historical agency of Ed Murrow, ‘a principled 
journalist who took a stand against a malignant demagogue and helped bring him 
down’. (Kemp, 2006: 58) 
 
There is also a production company, Participant Productions, replete with agency and 
intention, a company, operating in Hollywood, whose website bears the strap line and 
mission statement: 
 
Changing the world 
one story at a time  
Participant believes in the power of media to create great social change. Our goal 
is to deliver compelling entertainment that will inspire audiences to get involved 
in the issues that affect us all. [3] 
 
We did not expect that in the days of Hollywood-Mosfilm.. While analysis would of 
course complicate all of this, the play of agency is fertile ground for thinking through 
the pragmatics of contemporary authorship. 
 
And yet none of this quite answers Beckett’s question – ‘What matters who’s 
speaking…?’ – or even decides whether it is a question of indifference or of making a 
difference. Is there something more to the difference between Krommer and Mozart 
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than a dexterity in articulating the classical norms? Within the genius of the system, is 
there still room for the genius of the artist? 
 
While our engagement with authorship – and the attendant issues of agency, authority, 
intention, creativity – is greatly enriched and complicated by an empirical 
understanding of its historical and contemporary conditions of existence, an 
accumulation of interesting facts without a theory seems to me to lead by a different 
route to the ‘buffery’ which Bordwell tries so hard to avoid: a knowledge-based 
appropriation of film which is impressive without being fully satisfying as an account of 
our experience of cinema. It is theory which defines the questions which research asks 
and confounds the easy answers which assume the sufficiency of empirical knowledge: 
the beneficiary is a more complex and appropriate theory. There may not be a Theory of 
Everything, and the ‘Grand Theory’ which Bordwell characterizes and caricatures, if it 
ever existed, has probably now gone the way of the Grand Narrative of Progress. There 
still remain fields, however, which require a more sophisticated theoretical, as well as 
historical, understanding. One of these is the constantly shifting field of imagination and 
creativity, raising issues of art and authorship which the anti-humanism of earlier film 
theory has constantly avoided and for which Bordwell’s systematic rationality has not 
delivered satisfactory answers. A theory of creativity and the creative imagination in 
film and cinema is complicated, of course, by technology, industry, commerce and 
collective production, but without it film and cinema are impoverished and it is difficult 
to account for those cinephiliac moments which give us glimpses of the ‘kingdom of 
heaven’ and which make studying film an ‘affair of the heart’ as well as a quest for 
knowledge.  
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In his book, The Singularity of Literature, Derek Attridge concludes 
 
the attempt to do justice to literary works as events, welcoming alterity, 
countersigning the singular signature of the artist, inventively responding to 
invention, combined with a suspicion of all those terms that constitute the work as 
an object, is the best way to enhance the chances of achieving a vital critical 
practice. (2004: 137)  
 
Similarly in film studies, a criticism informed by empirical research but motivated by 
theory – including a theory which engages in new ways with authorship, creativity and 
invention – seems to me to be the only way of establishing a vital critical practice which 
avoids constituting the work as an object. 
 
Finally, then, the continuing work of theory is to keep alive debate and engagement, not 
simply applying institutionalized theories and knowledges, but rediscovering fields in 
which contesting theories of authorship and their conflicting desires and demands have 
historically played a key role. It is for this reason that I believe the writing in Cahiers du 
cinéma in the 1950s and 1960s still resonates, if not as a model of scholarship, at least 
as a confirmation that critical excitement and a love of films and cinema still has a role 
to play. In his book, Literature, Theory, and Common Sense – whose chapter on 
authorship and intention in literature repays attention – Antoine Compagnon describes a 
familiar scenario: 
 
 
 34
The theorists often give us the impression of raising very sensible criticisms 
against the positions of their adversaries; but as those adversaries, comforted by 
their ever clear conscience, refuse to give up and continue to hold forth, the 
theorists too begin to hold forth and push their own theses, or antitheses, to absurd 
lengths, and as a result annihilate themselves before their rivals, who are delighted 
to see themselves justified by the extravagance of their opponents’ position. 
(2004: 5) 
 
Despite the apparent absurdity of the ritual, Compagnon shares Casetti’s belief (and 
mine) in the importance of the productivity of theory, producing knowledge not only 
through research and the accumulation of information and understanding but also by 
constituting a field of discussion and debate – the field, in fact, of dialectics. Theory is 
important in the ‘rejuvenating struggle it led against received ideas in literary studies, 
and in the equally determined resistance with which those received ideas opposed it.’ 
(Compagnon, 2004: 5)  In the end, for Compagnon, 
 
 The aim of theory is in effect the defeat of common sense. It contests it, 
criticizes it, denounces it as a series of fallacies – the author, the world, the 
reader, style, history, value; theory makes it seem indispensable to begin by 
freeing oneself from these fallacies in order to talk about literature. But the 
resistance of common sense to theory is unimaginable… (193) 
 
The history of film studies charts a narrative in which the common sense of authorship 
has been contested time after time. Each common sense has been vanquished and each 
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theory institutionalized so effectively that the victor has become the new received idea; 
contested again, vanquished again; and a new common sense installed, waiting for the 
challenge of new theories. Beckett again: ‘Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try Again. 
Fail again. Fail better’ (1974: 1). At each stage, something is lost and something gained. 
The work of theory is still contestatory, moving forward dialectically, rather like Walter 
Benjamin’s Angel of History, continually looking backwards to pick up any fragments 
which may have been lost in the rubble of earlier encounters. The questions of art and 
authorship, creativity and imagination, may still prove an irritant in our attempts to 
come to terms with our complex engagements with cinema. 
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Notes 
 
 [1] ‘Epuration’, Andrew (1993: 77) tells us, was the period in post-war France when 
certain individuals, suspected of collaboration, were prohibited from working in the film 
industry.  
[2] This line is quoted by Foucault in ‘What is an author?’ (1977) and abbreviated as the 
final line of the essay. 
[3] http://www.participantproductions.com (Accessed 3 January 2007). 
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